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Public discourse on human trafficking and modern-day slavery is reach-
ing a tipping point—it is coming to be understood as a global problem with 
economic and policy implications far beyond simple reports of cross-border 
human trafficking. A decade ago most educated citizens considered slavery a 
phenomenon of the past, relegated to history textbooks. Today a strong narra-
tive has reached global proportions: activists, epistemic communities, NGOs, 
IGOs, and governments are acknowledging the scope and extent of slavery in 
the twenty-first century. One need only point to Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl 
Wu Dunn’s bestseller Half the Sky, President Barack Obama’s 2012 speech at the 
Clinton Global Intiative, or the awareness that celebrities such as Mira Sorvino 
and Jada Pinkett Smith are raising about the subject to illustrate how far the 
antislavery movement has progressed.1 
Yet despite such civic mindedness, surprisingly little data and empirically 
driven research exist on slavery today. Although some headway has been made 
in estimating its prevalence—most notably in the form of contributions by 
Kevin Bales and by the International Labor Organization (ILO)—apart from a 
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rough estimate of how many slaves exist in the world today (21 to 27 million), 
scholars and policy makers know little about the risk factors—let alone the busi-
ness impact—that contemporary slavery has on the global community.2 Indeed, 
most extant research, athough useful, is qualitative, not allowing for statistical 
models.3 To what extent is slavery empirically bad for business? For whom is 
the business of slavery profitable, and for whom is it economically burdensome? 
This article, using a novel dataset, demonstrates that slavery is empirically 
bad for business. Building upon the work of Robert Smith, our analysis exam-
ines the relationship between the prevalence of slavery in a country (in terms of 
the proportion of the population enslaved) and several economic measures (the 
United Nations Human Development Index, 
growth domestic product in terms of purchas-
ing power parity, access to financial services, 
and the Gini coefficient).4 In each instance, 
controlling for alternative explanations, greater 
levels of slavery are associated with a decline in economic growth and human 
development. The findings imply that beyond the morality of the issue, slavery 
is objectively harmful for total economic output and social development. This 
article begins with a discussion of how slavery is profitable for slaveholders and 
then proceeds with a discussion of how it undermines social and economic 
output at the macro level. 
Contemporary Slavery: profitable for SlaveholderS 
A significant amount of historical and economic research has examined the 
slavery of the past and clearly demonstrates its profitability for slaveholders.5 
As a legal enterprise, slavery in the past generated ancillary economic activity in 
the form of insurance, transport, advertising, loans, credit, mortgages, and so 
on. Governments could also tax proceeds from slave-trading and slave use and 
regulate the activities and procedures of slavery. Although a moral evil, histori-
cally slavery was good for business.6
Contemporary slavery, primarily due to its universal illegality, is a far dif-
ferent creature. The fundamental nature of slave work has not changed dramati-
cally; it is still dirty, dangerous, and demeaning. Most slaves work in agriculture, 
mining or other such extractive industries, assembly, food processing, manu-
facturing, or what might be called “personal (forced) services” such as domestic 
service or commercial sexual exploitation. It is a type of work that tends to be 
hidden because it is illegal in all countries and condemned in international law 
Slavery is objectively harmful 
for total economic output 
and social development. 
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as jus cogens, a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted. As an illegal 
economic activity, it is restricted, at least nominally, in all nation-states. On a 
moral level, no rational politician would condone slavery today. Indeed, nor-
matively, the twenty-first century is an age in which it is socially fashionable to 
wear T-shirts or display bumper stickers that promote the antislavery movement. 
On the other hand, contemporary slavery, like its historical antecedent, 
yields certain economic benefits, albeit for a very small portion of the global 
economy. The ILO estimates that about $44 billion USD per year is made in 
slavery-derived profits. Although this is a drop in the bucket of global economic 
output, valued at $74 trillion, it suggests that, at least for illicit markets, there 
are incentives to perpetute slavery.7 The profits of slavery flow primarily to 
slaveholders, who benefit from global markets and global prices. For example, 
a criminal who uses slaves to produce a cotton crop will sell his cotton at the 
same price as his neighbor who does not exploit slaves. They both receive the 
market price, one which is ultimately set in the global commodity exchanges. 
While both farmers receive the same price for their cotton, the slave-using farmer 
will have a higher profit margin due to his much lower labor cost, amounting 
to bare subsistence for his workers. With a guaranteed market price, he has no 
incentive to sell at a lower rate. As with many other criminal enterprises such 
as drug trafficking, the estimated profit margins found in contemporary slavery 
are sometimes astoundingly high.8 
Profit margins vary in contemporary slavery. At one end of the spectrum 
is the commercial sexual exploitation of enslaved women. Such an illegal—and 
extremely brutal—working-class brothel business has been found to generate 
profit margins in the order of 850 percent in the booming economy of Thailand, 
a locality with high levels of demand.
As Table 1 shows, the monthly profits from slavery in a working-class 
brothel in a small town in western Thailand are about $72,000. Annually, this 
yields a net profit of $864,000. Brothels serving richer clients or sex tourists 
might be expected to fare better. The fact that there are dozens of brothels in 
this small town alone suggests that enslavement for sexual exploitation is a 
multimillion-dollar business in the region. 
At the other end of the spectrum are traditional forms of enslavement that 
tend to be part of a country’s local economy. Brick kilns that rely on slave labor 
in rural Pakistan, for example, generate around 25 percent profit, compared to 
10–15 percent for those kilns that pay their workers. At the same time, hereditary 
forms of collateral debt bondage with similar profit margins, practiced in agricul-
tural slavery in northern India, remain extensive.9 Adding to the profitability of 
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contemporary slavery, regardless of the type of slavery, is the exceptionally low cost 
of acquiring slaves.10 For most of human history, slaves were expensive. In 1850, 
for example, the average price of an “average” slave in the American South (a 
“prime field hand” meaning a young man capable of heavy agricultural work) was 
between $1,000 and $1,200 in 1850 dollars, which equates to around $45,000 
in 2013 dollars.11 Today it could be argued that slaves are less expensive today 
than at any time in the past. In a marketplace in the central region of the Ivory 
Coast, one researcher easily purchased two 19-year-old agricultural workers for 
about $30 each. In India, bonded laborers are able to report precise sums that 
represent the acquisition cost required to enslave their family (often the debt 
being taken some generations previously and passed down)—ranging from as 
little as $10 to over $100. In Brazil desperate urban workers place themselves 
in the hands of recruiters only to find themselves held under violence far in the 
forests and charged with a “debt” amounting to a few hundred dollars. Even in 
Thailand, where teenagers are sold into prostitution and a premium is charged 
for their virginity and attractiveness, prices rarely go over $1000. 
Table 1. Monthly income and expenditures (in baht) for the always prospering 
brothel.U.S. figures adjusted for inflation for 2012. Source: Kevin Bales, Disposable 
People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (University of California Press, 1999). 
Low initial acquisition costs means that slave owners neglect the welfare 
 
Table 1. Monthly Income & Expenditure (in Baht) for the Always Prospering Brothel 
    
Costs (per month)  Income (per month)  
Rent 5,000 Commercial sex* 1,050,000 
Utilities & bills 2,000 Rent paid by prostitutes 600,000 
Food & drink 45,000 Sale of condoms 70,000 
Pimp’s salary 7,000 Sale of drinks 672,000 
Cashier 7,000 Virgin premium 50,000 
Cook 5,000 “Interest” on debt-bond 15,000 
Bribes 6,000   
Payments to taxis etc. 12,000   
Beer & whisky  168,000   
    
TOTAL COSTS 257,000 TOTAL INCOME 2,457,000 
(In US dollars) ($8,389)   
  MONTHLY PROFIT 2,200,000 
  (In U.S. dollars) ($71,813)             
 
*Average 14 clients per day at 125 baht per client for 20 prostitutes for 30 days. 
Source: Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, University of California 
Press, 1999. U.S. figures adjusted for inflation for the year 2012. 
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of enslaved people since replacement can be more cost effective than care. The 
cost of slaves is now so low that they are often seen as disposable inputs into 
criminal enterprises rather than as capital investments. 
tainted GoodS
Although slavery might benefit slaveholders, it negatively affects everyone else—
ranging from slaves to the global consumer—in different ways. The negative 
impact for global consumers is not economic but moral and political. Slavery does 
not reduce or increase prices but does involve consumers in illegal and immoral 
activities. Many countries including the United States prohibit the importation 
of slave-made goods, and case law going back to the eighteenth century allows 
the confiscation of goods that circumstantially may have been involved in the 
slave trade. Adding to this is the repugnance expressed by most consumers at the 
idea of buying goods made by slaves, especially child slaves—and that repugnance 
is hard to avoid. Slaves are used in the production of many basic commodities 
that flow from the poor Global South to the rich North, as well as of some 
goods, such as tomatoes and oranges, produced and consumed in the North.12 
Originating from numerous countries, documented cases of slavery exist in the 
production of textiles, gemstones, apparel, and agricultural products.13 Coffee 
is sometimes grown using slave labor, and some sugar is harvested by slaves. In 
the Congo, for example, armed gangs enslave local people and force them to dig 
minerals such as coltan, cassiterite, wolframite, and tungsten. These minerals 
are then sold to exporters who send them to Europe and Asia where they are 
used to make components needed for the production of cell phones, comput-
ers, and other electronics.14 Slavery also creeps into financial investments when 
pension funds or mutual funds carry stock in companies that subcontract other 
companies that use slave labor.15 
These modern, scattered, small-scale, and criminal slave-based enterprises 
contrast markedly with the relatively much larger economic organization of 
historical slavery, in which, as evil as it was, the economic benefits of the legal 
slave trade were diffused throughout local and regional economies. In the past, 
it could be assumed that a sizable proportion of commodities such as sugar and 
cotton was produced by slaves and that the profits from such enterprises would 
be cycled back through local, regional, and national economies along with the 
profits from other legitimate businesses.16 
Today, however, the situation is more complicated in that it is slaveholders 
who primarily benefit from contempary slavery. Consider the cocoa industry 
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in the twenty-first century. In the Ivory Coast, there are about 600,000 small 
family farms that grow cocoa, producing just under half of the world’s supply.17 
Young men, normally from neighboring countries such as Mali, migrate looking 
for work. In remote rural areas, some are tricked and enslaved into working on 
farms that grow a range of crops, including cocoa for export. While no one knows 
for certain how many of these farms use slaves, the percentage of farms using 
slaves is likely to be in the single digits.18 When the farmers sell their cocoa to 
wholesalers, the slave-grown cocoa is mixed with the free-labor cocoa, and there 
is currently no way to tell the two apart. 
The farmer who exploits slaves and the 
farmer that does not will receive exactly 
the same price for their cocoa at the farm 
gate. In this way, the profits of slavery 
are retained by the slaveholder and are not passed up along the product chain. 
The cocoa that is exported from the Ivory Coast to Europe and North America 
to be made into chocolate, used in other foodstuffs, or made into cosmetics is 
also mixed with cocoa from other countries; thus, it becomes even harder to 
distinguish the fraction that is tainted by slavery.19 This concealment of slave-
made commodities, made possible through blending in global supply chains, also 
applies to cotton, sugar, gold, shrimp, and a host of other products. What the 
case of cocoa illustrates, and what applies to virtually all slave-based businesses, 
is that profits from slavery tend to accrue solely to the criminal slaveholder and 
are not passed up the product chain in the form of lower prices to consumers.
the effeCtS of Slavery on human development
Contemporary slavery yields a number of negative social and economic effects. 
Slaves, subjects of violence and intimidation on a systematic basis, are unwilling 
agents of economic stagnation. From a fiscal perspective, slave labor tends to 
pull down the wages of free labor in the same area, thus lessening the disposable 
incomes of free families. At the same time, slaves are not able to play a full role 
in their local economy in that they have little or no purchasing power and so 
they subsist on the barest necessities. 
More generally, slaves, by the nature of their social position, have no means 
to contribute to the economy except in minimal ways. They are not at liberty to 
purchase anything in a country’s markets. Therefore, slaves, as a group—denied 
the benefits of human development in the form of education, access to politi-
cal participation, and self-direction—remain an untapped economic resource. 
The profits of slavery are retained 
by the slaveholder and are not 
passed up along the product chain.
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Slavery generates a downward spiral of social and economic stuntedness. It is a 
social and economic cancer. 
Only very recently did scholars begin to examine the impact of slavery on 
human development. In 2009 Robert Smith was among the first to analyze a 
number of factors that were thought to affect social and economic development 
as measured by the United Nations Human Development Index; these factors 
included corruption, regime type, internal conflict, national debt, geography, 
and culture.20 For the first time in a study of contemporary nation-states, Smith 
included measures of slavery in the analysis of human development using an 
earlier version of data from Kevin Bales of Free the Slaves, the center for the 
modern abolitionist movement.21
Smith’s study explored the impact that slavery might have on human de-
velopment and provided insight as to how slavery might fit with other factors 
that are known to affect development. Given the large amount of work that 
has been done to explore determinants of development in the Global South, it 
was remarkable that, as Smith explains, “When the full range of the covariates 
are retained, and when the four categories of slavery are used to classify the re-
gions, the resulting ... statistics imply that slavery explains much of the regional 
variability in the Human Development Index rank scores.”22 Smith went on to 
identify the policy implications:
Among the covariates studied here, slavery (debt bondage, forced labor, 
forced prostitution, chattel slavery) and the lack of political freedom 
explain much of the variability that is between regions and corruption 
explains much of the variability among countries within a region. 
Additionally, countries with higher values of conflict and social unrest 
and higher values of national debt have significantly worse Human 
Development Index rank. To enhance human development countries 
should eliminate debt bondage and other forms of slavery, move toward 
fully democratic political systems, and eliminate corruption.23
Clearly there can be mutually reinforcing relationships among these factors. 
These interrelationships point to the circular and reinforcing nature of human 
rights violations. In terms of human development and economic development, 
the result from Smith’s analysis is clear: slavery impedes economies and societ-
ies even though the proportion of slaves in the global population is small, their 
productive capacity is small, and their economic value, as measured by price, 
has reached an all-time low.
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 the relationShip between Slavery and the human development index 
The next step in this research agenda is to explore the empirical relationship be-
tween slavery and human development. A challenge arises, however, in obtaining 
data to approximate the prevalence of slavery around the globe. Estimates vary 
based on differing approaches that use secondary source estimates and country-
level, random sample surveys. The ILO estimates that there are 21 million 
slaves in the world today. Based on the data used by this article, however, this 
figure is somewhat higher, upwards of 27 million.24 Part of the reason for the 
discrepancy is in the transparency of the research methods made available.25 As 
scholarship on human trafficking and modern-day slavery develops over time, 
the complete sharing of data and methods used will help resolve the difference 
observed in the number of slaves. 
We begin by exploring the relationship between the prevalence of slavery 
and the UN Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI, as the UN reports, 
“is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achieve-
ments in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life (health), access to knowledge (education), and a decent standard of 
living (income).”26 HDI is measured on an interval scale, from zero (represent-
ing “low development”) to one (indicating “high development”). We use data 
from the year 2012. For the 162 countries in our dataset for which we have a 
corresponding measure of slavery prevalence, we find that the measure of HDI 
has considerable range, with a minimum value of 3.04 percent (for the country 
of Somalia) and a maximum value of 95.5 percent (for Norway). Countries on 
average have an HDI score of 66.7 percent, which indicates “reasonably high 
development.”27 
Our first hypothesis is higher levels of the prevalence of slavery lead to lower 
levels of HDI, all else being equal. In other words, we believe that slavery is a 
powerful predictive factor in understanding cross-national variation in human 
development. We test this in two ways, first by observing the graphical relation-
ship between the two variables (HDI and Prevalence) as Figure 1 illustrates. 
In Figure 1, our measure of slavery is on the x axis (in which we have 
taken the log of this measure so as to normalize its distribution) and the HDI 
measure is on the y axis. Each dot in Figure 1 represents one of the countries 
in our dataset. Note the downward sloping shape of the graph, which suggests 
that, as we hypothesized, higher levels of slavery correlate with lower levels of 
HDI. Conversely, lower levels of slavery correspond to higher levels of HDI. A 
bivariate regression analysis yields that this finding is statistically significant at 
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the 0.001-level and explains about 55 percent of the variance we observe (R2 = 
0.55). This finding substantiates Smith’s reasoning that slavery is a useful factor in 
understanding variation in social and economic development around the globe. 
Figure 1. The relationship between the Human Development Index and slavery.
Of course, correlation does not imply causation. Simply because there is 
a strong bivariate relationship between HDI and slavery does not mean that 
the latter causes the former. Indeed, the relationship may be spurious. In this 
instance, to control for the possibility of a spurious relationship, it is important to 
account for other competing explanations that may shed light on cross-national 
variation in HDI, independent of slavery. If, while holding these other factors 
constant, the relationship between slavery and HDI maintains statistical signifi-
cance, then we have greater support for our hypothesis. In this light we include 
three control variables, the first of which accounts for cross-national variation 
in literacy rates, given that scholarship suggests that education is a powerful 
predictor of human development and economic growth.28 We measure education 
in terms of literacy (on a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent) from the United 
Nations Development Program.29 The second variable examines cross-national 
variation in regime type, given that some scholars argue that higher levels of 
democratization lead to greater levels of productivity and growth.30 We obtain 
data for this measure from Freedom House, which ranks all the countries of 
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the globe on a linear scale from 2 (“highly free”) to 14 (“not free).31 The third 
variable captures cross-national variation in geography, given that differences 
in human development and productivity may be explained at least in part by 
geographic diversity.32 We account for this with dummy variables for Western 
Europe, North America, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, and 
the Middle East, using Sub-Saharan Africa as our baseline.
Slavery (log) -4.487***
(0.532)
Literacy 0.546***
(0.0343)
Regime Type -0.615***
(0.176)
Western Europe -2.698
(1.750)
North America -4.395
(13.85)
Central and Eastern Europe -2.293
(1.945)
Asia 1.926
(1.688)
Latin America -1.334
(1.756)
The Middle East -1.295
(1.682)
Constant -2.232
(4.014)
N 160
R2 0.84
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 2. Human development indicators (robust standard errors in parentheses).
Table 2 presents the results of our first multivariate model, in which 
we regress HDI on our slavery measure while controlling for literacy rates, 
regime type, and geographic variation. The results of Table 2 lend support for 
our hypothesis. Holding literacy rates, regime type, and geography constant, 
a one-percent increase in the prevalence of slavery is associated with a 0.045 
percent decrease in human development, other things being equal. This finding 
is significant at the 0.001-level and lends credence to Smith’s claims. Two other 
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variables, literacy and regime type, also hold statistical significance.
Yet HDI does not capture total economic output, which prompts another 
question: What is the relationship between slavery and overall economic output? 
That is, to what extent does slavery influence the average person’s ability to make 
a decent living on the macro level? 
An excellent measure for economic output is gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita in terms of purchasing power parity.33 Countries vary considerably 
in terms of how much the average citizen makes. Following the logic of Smith, 
we argue that higher levels of slavery predict lower levels of GDP, all else being 
equal. This is our second hypothesis. We obtain data for GDP per capita from 
the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” using data from the year 
2011.34 GDP per capita varies considerably, with a minimum value of $277 (for 
Somalia), a maximum value of $82,978 (for Qatar), and a standard deviation 
of $14,537. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between slavery and GDP and 
casts support for our second hypothesis. 
Figure 2. The relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) and slavery.
Like the information presented in Figure 1, the data in Figure 2 illustrates 
a downward-sloping, negative relationship between the outcome we seek to 
understand (GDP per capita) and the key explanatory variable of interest (the 
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prevalence of slavery by country). A bivariate regression analysis reveals that 
the finding is statistically significant at the 0.001-level and explains about 39 
percent of the variance we observe (R2 = 0.39). A multivariate regression analysis 
(using the same control variables as we did for the HDI hypothesis) yields the 
following output. 
Slavery (log) -5260.3***
(734.8)
Literacy 143.0***
(41.38)
Regime Type -148.8
(364.4)
Western Europe 2753.9
(3429.1)
North America -3239.6
(2187.6)
Central and Eastern Europe 1475.0
(2631.1)
Asia -2496.7
(2249.3)
Latin America -3109.1
(2531.4)
The Middle East 204.8
(4837.5)
Constant -31747.7***
(7178.9)
N 160
R2 0.44
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 3. Gross domestic product (robust standard errors in parentheses).
Table 3 sheds light on the extent to which the prevalence of slavery is asso-
ciated with GDP per capita. Holding literacy rates, regime type, and geography 
constant, a one-percent increase in the prevalance of slavery is associated with 
a $52.6 decrease in per capita GDP. Thus, a 10-percent increase corresponds to 
a $526 decrease in GDP per capita—not a small sum.
At this point, it would be fair to ask if the measurement of slavery’s impact 
on GDP is sufficiently robust given that the criminal market is not normally 
included in any computation of GDP. Since the proceeds of the underground 
economy are untraceable and thus untaxable, how might their existence be alter-
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ing our understanding of the influence of slavery on GDP? There is no perfect 
answer to this question given the lack of data on the size of untraceable criminal 
economic activity in each country, but in the case of slavery this uncounted 
output should not dramatically alter the results 
presented for two reasons. First, in virtually all 
economies, the estimated value of slavery within 
the criminal economy is much lower than the 
sums generated by drugs, weapons, gambling, 
and general corruption. Second, a significant 
part of slave-produced goods and economic activity are counted in GDP, but 
without the fact of slave origin being known. Note that cocoa, cotton, iron, 
shrimp and fish, and minerals for electronics can all have slave origin and still 
be counted in national output. The key point here is that it is the slavery that 
is hidden, not the export goods or the profits made on them.
Regardless of whether HDI or GDP per capita is used, a story begins to 
emerge: slavery is associated with outcomes that are harmful not only for eco-
nomic and social development (as HDI illustrates) but also for economic output 
per citizen (as GDP per capita illustrates). These are macro estimates. We are not 
arguing that the lives of most families and individuals are directly affected by 
slavery—far from it. However, from a systemic perspective, the evidence suggests 
that slavery significantly depresses social and economic output at the aggregate 
level. Based on these data, we find further reason to substantiate Smith’s logic that 
slavery yields serious negative outcomes of global proportions despite the small 
ancillary benefits that a small population of contemporary slaveholders reap. 
Let us press on with Smith’s logic by exploring two more indicators of so-
cial productivity. One measure of interest is the access to financial services that 
the average citizen can obtain in a given country. Access to financial services 
is crucial for upward social mobility. Without access to credit, there is often 
little the average family can do to improve its lot in life. We obtain data for this 
measure from scholarship by Patrick Honohan, affiliated with the World Bank, 
Trinity College Dublin, and the Center for Economic and Political Research.35 
Honohan’s research has generated a cross-national measure of access to financial 
services that ranks on a scale from 0 (no access) to 100 (full access). The de-
scriptive statistics for this measure are interesting. The country with the lowest 
ranking is Kyrgyzstan (which received a 1), and the country with the highest 
is the Netherlands (which received a 100). The standard deviation is about 28 
points, indicating a great deal of cross-national variation in this measure. 
Our third hypothesis is higher levels of slavery will be correlated with lower 
The key point here is that it 
is the slavery that is hidden, 
not the export goods or 
the profits made on them.
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levels of access to financial service. We find graphical evidence of this in Figure 3.
Figure 3. The relationship between access to financial services and slavery.
Similar to Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 illustrates a downward-sloping, nega-
tive relationship between access to financial services (on the y axis) and the 
prevalence of slavery (on the x axis). A bivariate regression analysis informs us 
that this finding is also statistically significant at the 0.001-level and explains 
about 49 percent of the variance we observe (R2 = 0.49). A multivariate analysis, 
as seen in Table 4, reveals that a one-percent increase in the prevalence of slavery 
is associated with about a tenth of a unit decrease in access to financial services. 
Thus, a ten-percent increase in slavery corresponds to about a one-unit decrease in 
access to financial services, other things being equal.
Once again, the data points to the destructive social and economic conse-
quences of contemporary slavery, but it is important to reflect on the circular 
nature of this particular relationship as well—lack of access to credit can place 
poor families in extreme vulnerability to enslavement in times of crisis, in which 
individuals and families are removed from the credit market, cut off from ever 
being credit consumers.
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Slavery (log) -10.54***
(1.515)
Literacy 0.123
(0.0891)
Regime Type -2.514***
(0.428)
Western Europe 2.675
(4.213)
North America 20.83*
(10.33)
Central and Eastern Europe 5.492
(4.690)
Asia -3.856
(5.112)
Latin America -9.024
(5.099)
The Middle East -7.879
(5.356)
Constant -17.56*
(8.821)
N 139
R2 0.64
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 4. Access to financial services (robust standard errors in parentheses).
The last measure we explore is the level of economic equality/inequality in 
the world today. There is evidence of a growing gap between the Global South 
and the North. As the rich countries get richer, the poor countries get poorer. Our 
fourth hypothesis is that greater levels of slavery should be correlated with higher 
levels of global inequality. The measure we use to test this is the Gini coefficient, 
the data for which we obtain from the World Bank. 36 The Gini coefficient is a 
measure of income inequality, on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents 
perfect inequality and 0 signifies perfect equality. Thus, a lower score on the 
Gini coefficient scale is better than a higher score. Among the data we have, 
the country with the highest amount of income inequality is Namibia (a score 
of 63.9) and the country with the lowest income inequality is Denmark (24.7). 
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Figure 4. The relationship between the Gini coefficient and slavery.
Figure 4 suggests that Smith’s thinking bears out: there is an upward-
sloping, positive relationship between the Gini coefficient (on the y axis) and 
our measure of the prevalence of slavery (on the x axis). Higher levels of slavery 
correlate with greater levels of economic inequality. Although this finding is 
significant at the 0.001-level, the R2 compared to those of the other models is 
quite modest, explaining only about seven percent of the variance we observe. 
A multivariate analysis, similar to the results of Tables 2, 3, and 4, reveals that 
our measure of slavery prevalence is significant at the 0.10-level in its association 
with the Gini coefficient, holding literacy, regime type, and geography constant.
ConCluSion
While slavery may make high profits for a small number of slaveholders, we argue 
that the practice tends to disproportionately depress a country’s economy. Since 
the work of slaves is generally concentrated at the lowest end of the economic 
ladder in basic, low-skill jobs that are dirty and dangerous, slave output contrib-
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utes little to national production. Slaves are normally not able to acquire assets 
or access credit and just as it is for the free working poor, credit access and asset 
acquisition are key determining factors for achievement of economic autonomy. 
Except in the way they benefit criminals, we assert that slaves, though practically 
invisible, exert a strong, negative pull on local and national economies through 
their lack of full economic participation.
At the same time, there is a fruitful area for future research in the posi-
tive impact on local, regional, and national economies that coincides with the 
liberation of those in slavery. Recent longitudinal research by Free the Slaves 
among villages in northern India that have high levels of hereditary debt-bondage 
slavery demonstrates a dramatic increase in economic activity (as well as human 
development measures) following liberation.37 The eradication of slavery has 
long been sought on moral and philisophical grounds; this new research suggests 
that the rationale for liberation might be extended to economic ends as well. 
While slavery tends to deaden economic activity, it appears that liberation may 
be an important economic stimulus. This is important because the resources 
needed to reduce global slavery, while relatively small when compared to other 
social problems, are not forthcoming.38 The idea that the eradication of slavery 
might ultimately pay for itself through economic growth is one that needs 
demonstration. If “slavery is bad for business” is a hypothesis worth exploring, 
how much more so is its mirror assertion that freedom from slavery generates 
economic growth? 
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